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Abstract: Modern email and instant messaging applications often offer private communications. In doing so, they share
common concerns about how security and privacy can be compromised, how they should face similar threats,
and how to comply with comparable system requirements. Assuming a scenario where servers may not be
trusted, we review and analyze a list of threats specifically against message delivering, archiving, and contact
synchronization. We also describe a list of requirements intended for whom undertakes the task of implement-
ing secure and private messaging. The cryptographic solutions available to mitigate the threats and to comply
with the requirements may differ, as the two applications are built on different assumptions and technologies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Long stating facts have made clear to the pub-
lic that governments routinely collect and invest in
the ability to massively eavesdrop private messages
of citizens (Stanger, 2019). In response to such rev-
elations, and sensitized to preserve the “right to pri-
vacy” (e.g., see (European Parliament and the Eu-
ropean Council, 2016)) beyond trusting authorities,
messaging servers, and communication channels, an
increasing number of companies are investing in pri-
vate messaging solutions (Unger et al., 2015). Private
messaging can be realized, for instance, in E-mailing
applications (e.g., Protonmail, p≡p (Marques et al.,
2019)). It can be offered in instance messaging (e.g.,
Signal, Telegram).
Whatever the hosting system, E-mailing or a In-
stant Messaging (IM), private messaging should en-
sure that, in an written exchange between peers, no
one but the sender and the intended receiver(s) are ca-
pable of reading the messages at any time: past, cur-
rent, and future.
Realizing this goal can be challenging despite the
many off-the-shelves security APIs and libraries to-
day available for software engineers. In the two
types of systems, private messaging may realize dif-
ferent mitigation mechanisms or satisfy different de-
sign choices. For instance, confidentiality can be
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preserved in multiple ways and with various cryp-
tographic primitives and, in a situation where lack
of privacy may endanger one’s life, such as in in-
vestigative journalism, such solutions are expected
to be more stringent than those called for in situa-
tions where users relaxedly exchange messages with
a broad public.
It must be said that the urgency of realizing private
messaging is lively debated. As it has been already es-
tablished for paper mail, secrecy of correspondence is
regarded as a fundamental legal principle of democra-
cies in many countries (Marotta and Russell, 2013). It
is often argued that preserving the privacy of commu-
nication between humans should be taken for granted;
that it should be respected and protected as a funda-
mental human right (Council of Europe: European
Court of Human Rights, 2016); and that the commu-
nication of peers has to be protected in a self-evident
manner. An ongoing discussion, mainly following
the revelation by Edward Snowden and other whistle-
blowers (Stanger, 2019), evaluates whether protec-
tions should be delivered by the offering technology
and independent of what the user wants to write or
why. In this discussion, E-mailing and messaging sys-
tems are regarded as the central and most prominent
digital communication means using which to realize
that legal principle.
The problem is that composing security compo-
nents without a clear understanding of the threats
leads to unclear or incomplete privacy guarantees.
Without that understanding, an application is likely
to need to be patched to fix vulnerabilities discovered
in the meantime (Dkg, 2019; Rijhansen, 2019), and
this is not optimal. Better, it is an approach capable
of ensuring privacy-by-design: here the appropriate
workflow demands first deciding against what threats
one intends to uphold and then listing the related func-
tional requirements, to fulfil which appropriate solu-
tions are selected.
Contribution In reference to both E-mailing and
IM, we describe the entities involved, the operations,
and the system features of such applications. While
discussing similarities in the two types of applica-
tions, we highlight the differences. Considering users
and systems as assets and assuming that servers may
be untrustworthy, we also orderly catalogue threats
against privacy messaging, and discuss security re-
quirements to mitigate them.
As such, this work offers a systematization of
threats and requirements for use of experts. The work
aim to assist them to assess current E-mailing and IM
applications and to design implement more robust pri-
vate messaging systems. Although limited to three
specific protocols in private messaging (messages ex-
change, search and archiving, and contact synchro-
nization), our list of threats and requirements carry
already a quite rich set of challenges for whomever
aims to realize private messaging in E-mailing and
IM. It is also an introduction to private messaging
for non-experts.
2 Background and related work
E-mailing and IM are two types of messaging appli-
cations. E-mailing depends on Simple Mail Trans-
fer Protocol (SMTP) for email transmission (Klensin,
2008). SMTP has been designed with no built-in se-
curity. As a result, there is no prevention from ad-
versaries aiming for eavesdropping, spoofing, and im-
personating email messages and addresses. IM in-
stead, depends on Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP), a near-real-time messaging proto-
col consisting of relatively small chunks of Exten-
sible Markup Language (XML) structured data be-
tween network endpoints (Saint-Andre, 2004). For
XMPP, Transport Layer Security (TLS) offers chan-
nel encryption between the application peers, for in-
stance a user client and its IM server.
E-mailing stands for high-latency and asyn-
chronous communication in message delivery. It
means that the communicating parties are not required
to be simultaneously online (Resnick, 2008). IM
is traditionally considered as low-latency and syn-
chronous, with the peers required to be online in order
to exchange messages (Saint-Andre, 2011). However,
nowadays certain instant messaging applications al-
low high-latency and asynchronous message delivery.
WhatsApp and Signal (Signal, 2013) as examples of
new generation IM. Despite the differences, messag-
ing applications offer common features such as trans-
mitting messages, archiving, searching, and option-
ally recipient’s identity verification and contacts list
management.
For E-mailing and IM, there are protocols that
enable users to exchange messages in a secure and
privacy-enhancing way. Clark et al. (Clark et al.,
2018) lists the state of the art protocols for secure E-
mailing and Shirazi et al., (Shirazi et al., 2018) for
privacy with the main focus on anonymous remail-
ers. Unger et al. (Unger et al., 2015) list protocols for
secure messaging, and Ermoshina et al. (Ermoshina
et al., 2016) provides a short overview of decentral-
ized E-mailing and IM applications. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no existing work that method-
ologically analyzes the security and privacy threats
and corresponding requirements for private messag-
ing.
3 Methodology
For a system model analysis in private messaging we
extracted the entities involved and the features that
a system considers by following the work of (Saint-
Andre, 2011; Klensin, 2008; Unger et al., 2015; Clark
et al., 2018; Ermoshina et al., 2016; Shirazi et al.,
2018) (see Fig. 1).
With a focus on private messaging consider-
ing untrusted servers, we compile the list of secu-
rity and privacy threats for both E-mailing and IM.
To distinguish and group the classes of threats and
requirements we apply the STRIDE threat model-
ing (Howard and Lipner, 2009; Microsoft, 2010) for
security and LINDDUN (Deng et al., 2011) for pri-
vacy. Both frameworks are used by the industry and
the research community nowadays (Danezis et al.,
2015; Symeonidis et al., 2017).
We need to stress that we extended LINDDUN
threat modeling in two different ways. We incorpo-
rate content unawareness to policy and consent non-
compliance threat. Note that, content unawareness
is considered as a principle of policy and consent
non-compliance under General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) (European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Council, 2016), and thus we consider under the
policy requirement. Moreover, we extended LIND-
DUN to include the privacy interdependence privacy
threat. There are scenarios where the privacy of in-
dividuals is bound to be affected by the decisions of
others (Biczo´k and Chia, 2013). For example, a re-
cipient of an email can forward a message to others
without the original sender’s notification and consent.
Moreover, in messaging systems such as on What-
sApp, users can upload their contacts list in messag-
ing servers. It enables the servers to learn and extract
information about the network of users, enabling pri-
vacy interdependence.
4 System model
This section outlines a private messaging system. It
describes the entities involved, the information as user
assets that can be collected by the system, and the fea-
tures of a private messaging system. We follow the re-
quirements extracted from real world systems and ap-
plications as well as from the academic literature for
E-mailing and instant messaging (Unger et al., 2015;
Clark et al., 2018; Ermoshina et al., 2016).
4.1 Operations and entities
We describe a set of operations and corresponding en-
tities that are involved in E-mailing and IM messaging
systems.
Users as sender and receiver(s): The communi-
cating parties who exchange messages, typically re-
ferred to as senders and receivers.
Trust Establishment (TE) supports operations for:
(i) authenticating a user, (ii) storing and distributing
cryptographic material as well as (ii) synchronizing
contacts of users. It utilizes identity management, key
management and contact management servers. Note
that, the operations that occur for TE are system de-
pendent and can vary.
Message Exchange (ME) supports operations for
message delivery and synchronization. It utilizes E-
mailing and IM servers for the delivery and synchro-
nization of messages between users i.e., the sender
and receiver(s).
Networking nodes (NetND) is referred to all
the Internet nodes for interconnected users and E-
mailing/IM servers.
Third party is any other entity interacting with the
messaging system.
4.2 System features and user assets
In addition to enabling communication, i.e., send-
ing and receiving messages and attachments, there
is a minimum set of common features that both E-
mailing and IM systems should offer: (i) Archive and
search through messages and attachments; (ii) Con-
tacts synchronization, and search; (iii) Group mes-
sages exchange; (iv) Multi-device synchronization of
messages and contacts across devices. In this work,
we focus on threats and requirements for messages
exchange, archiving/search and contact synchroniza-
tion.
Considering untrusted servers, the following as-
sets of users needs to be protected in private messag-
ing systems: (i) Identity and identification material of
sender/receiver such as e-mail, phone numbers, and
public keys; (ii) Contacts list consisting of but not
limited to e-mail, phone numbers, names, and public
keys; (iii) Content as text and attachments; (iv) Meta-
data consisting of but not limited to the identity of the
sender/receiver, packet size, and timing.
5 Threats and requirements
5.1 Adversarial model
An adversary is any entity that leverages threats
against a system. The goal of an adversary is to gain
improper access to messages or any information from
or about the users. An adversary can be anyone who is
involved in communication such as, the users, the TE
and ME entities (e.g., the E-mailing and IM servers),
the Networking Nodes (NetND), the Third Party (TP),
or even a subset of all those entities.
Types of an adversary can be distinguished de-
pending on whether the entity is a passive eavesdrop-
per or an active participant in the communication and
on whether it is internal to the private messaging sys-
tem or an external TP one (see Table 1).
Table 1: Adversarial model: passive/active and inter-
nal/external adversaries on user/system assets.
Passive Active
User assets System assets
Internal
(TE, ME, User) read (server) read + write (server) execute (server)
External
(TP) read (link) read + write (link) availability attack (server)
Passive vs active: A passive attacker can only
eavesdrop (i.e., read) messages and off-line process
them. It cannot interfere with the execution of the
communication protocol. An active attacker can tam-
per with a protocol’s messages: it can read and write
messages, can execute commands for gaining access
to system resources, and delay or replay messages.
LAYER 1: Trust establishment
LAYER 2: Content
IM server 
(e.g., XMPP)
LAYER 3: Networking
Identity, Key and Contact Management server 
(e.g., OpenPGP)
Alice BobH | B
E-mail / IM
H | B
E-mail / IM
H | B
E-mail / IM
Sender ReceiverEmail servers 
(e.g., SMTP)
Third Party
IM: Instant Messaging

Message format: 
H: Header (i.e., metadata)  
B: Body (i.e., text, attachments)
Figure 1: Communication systems: emailing, instant messaging and key management servers.
Internal vs external: An internal adversary can
seize control of one or of multiple entities that are
part of the system. It aims to extract information
from a specific entity or to prevent a message from
being sent. An external adversary can only com-
promise the communication channels, eavesdrop and
tamper with the messages, such as performing Man-
in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks. It can also monitor
and control several parts of the network, granting the
adversary the ability to correlate network traffic (Mur-
doch and Danezis, 2005) such as performing timing
attacks (Levine et al., 2004; Zhu et al., 2010).
Attackers can combine adversarial properties to
increase the effectiveness and the probability of suc-
cess of an attack. For instance, an external passive
attacker can monitor multiple channels of a system,
whereas an active internal adversary can tamper with
the messages of a targeted server (e.g., the E-mailing
and IM servers) (Dı´az et al., 2002). In this work, we
focus on TE and ME, excluding attacks on network-
ing nodes (NetND).
Assumptions We assume that end-points are secure
and authenticated. For instance, mobile devices are
malware free and users need to authenticate accessing
their phones.
5.2 Security threats and requirements
We describe the security threats and corresponding re-
quirements in six main classes, namely: spoofing and
entity authentication; tampering with data and data
authentication, repudiation and non-repudiation; in-
formation disclosure and confidentiality, denial-of-
service and availability; elevation of privilege and au-
thorization (see Table 2).
Spoofing and entity authentication Spoofing oc-
curs when an adversary successfully impersonates the
profile of a valid user, gaining improper access to the
information exchanged in the system. Spoofing is a
critical step in phishing, spamming and in MiTM at-
tacks (Hu and Wang, 2018). Here, we focus on threats
related to establishing End-to-End (E2E) encryption
such as public key spoofing attacks.
Public key spoofing threat is posed when a com-
municating party receives and utilize cryptographic
material (i.e., a public key) that does not correspond
to an intended user, recipient of a message in the sys-
tem. For example, spoofing is when Alice receives a
public key that she assumes be Bob’s key when in-
stead the key is Eve’s. That can occur in the presence
of an adversarial identity management server during
TE. An active identity management adversary can at-
tempt to provide counterfeit cryptographic material,
such as public keys, to the intended communicating
parties.
To mitigate spoofing threats, entity authentication
mechanisms should be in place. Public key verifica-
tion is crucial between the communicating users in
private messaging systems considering untrusted key
management servers. To verify that a user is the le-
gitimate owner of a public key, peer-to-peer solutions
to key verification systems exist (Finney et al., 2007;
Garfinkel, 1995), where users utilizing out-of-band
channels to manually to the verification. Here, users
can verify the fingerprints or some more usable alter-
natives, like trustwords (Marques et al., 2019). Peer-
to-peer solutions have limitations in key verification
and management (i.e., distribution, synchronization,
and revocation) between the communication entities,
though. Other approaches are possible to ensure au-
thentication even when servers are untrusted. Keys
can be stored encrypted, for instance. Keys can be
authenticated and agreed in a distributed manner with
the use of multiparty computation.
Tampering with data and data authentication
Tampering with data occurs when an adversary al-
ter the messages exchanged between the ME enti-
ties in the system. For instance, an adversary may
(stealthily) change the content of an E-mailing or an
instant message.
To contain this threat, data authentication of mes-
sages exchanged needs to be guaranteed: users should
be able to verify that messages have not been mod-
ified in transit, and only verified messages should
be accepted. Nowadays, application encryption and
data authentication exist between the E-mailing and
IM servers during the ME as a minimum secu-
rity requirement in commercial messaging systems
such as Gmail and Facebook messenger. For in-
stance STARTTTLS offers e-mail encryption from
IM (Saint-Andre, 2004) and e-mail for SMTP (Hoff-
man, 2002) and IMAP/POP3 (Newman, 1999). Thus,
network nodes cannot read and alter the messages
during message transit but the E-mailing and IM
servers. Thus, end-to-end data authentication should
be guaranteed such as with Message Authentication
Code (MAC) and digital signatures in combination.
Repudiation, non-repudiation, and accountability
Adversaries can repudiate the status of a message to
users or the ME entities of the system. For instance,
an adversary may attempt to deny having sent or re-
ceived an E-mailing or an instant message. Users who
are involved during the communication can be con-
sidered as adversaries assuming TE and ME entities
as passive adversaries. That is an reasonable assump-
tion, as it is against their interest of companies such
as Google and Facebook messenger to not perform
the operations of E-mailing and IM properly.
To mitigate repudiation threats non-repudiation of
actions performed and accountability must be guar-
anteed. Non-repudiation of an action can consist of a
proof of origin, submission, delivery, and receipt be-
tween the intended users (Zhou and Gollmann, 1997).
Non-repudiation can be achieved with the use of cryp-
tographic primitives, such as digital signatures, and
audit trails, such as timestamps.
Information disclosure and confidentiality Infor-
mation disclosure happens when an adversary suc-
ceeds in revealing the content of messages exchanged.
The adversary can attempt to perform MiTM and
eavesdrop the conversations of users in messaging
systems. Therefore, confidentiality of messages ex-
changed within a system should be guaranteed. Com-
munication confidentiality ensures that the messages
exchanged are only readable by the involved users.
Considering untrusted ME servers, the solution of
E2E encryption is essential in contrast to applica-
tion layer encryption aiming to mitigate MiTM at-
tacks. Confidentiality of messages for E2E encryption
systems can be achieved with encryption schemes
such as symmetric, asymmetric, and malleable en-
cryption (Borisov et al., 2004).
Another challenged to confidentiality is the stor-
age and archiving of messages exchange. An adver-
sary can passively collect and store messages in an
attempt to retrieve or break the E2E encryption keys
and compromise future or past messages. Perfect for-
ward and backward secrecy needs to be guaranteed
for private messaging. It ensures that past messages
cannot be recovered retroactively. Essentially, in key
agreement protocols, past session keys are not com-
promised even if long-term keys are compromised.
Here, we stress, there are difference between E-
mailing’s and IM’s solutions to achieve perfect for-
ward secrecy. For low latency protocols, i.e., IM,
where users are online, perfect forward secrecy can
be achieved generating session keys such as using
Diffie-Hellman key agreement (Menezes et al., 1996;
Diffie and Hellman, 1976) in Off-The-Record (OTR)
messaging (Borisov et al., 2004). However, the
high-latency of E-mailing makes the session keys ap-
proach impractical (Borisov et al., 2004). Both Al-
ice and Bob required to be online since the key ex-
change must be completed before the message is
sent. Perfect forward secrecy for high-latency sys-
tems can be achieved with solutions such as ring sig-
natures (Rivest et al., 2001).
If for a compromise of long-term keys subsequent
cipher-texts cannot be decrypted, then the protocol
guarantees also backward secrecy for private messag-
ing (Borisov et al., 2004).
Denial of service attacks and availability Denial-
of-Service attack (DoS) occurs when adversary man-
ages to make system inaccessible to one or more
users. For instance, an adversary may target the TE
and ME entities of the messaging system such as
the Identity Management, the IM and the E-mailing
server (Dkg, 2019; Rijhansen, 2019). The capabili-
ties of an adversary can be from script kiddies to even
state-sponsored adversaries, considered as active ex-
ternal TP adversaries. To reduce the threat of DoS,
availability of the system must be guaranteed. Net-
work security tools such as intrusion prevention sys-
tems and redundant systems such as utilizing multi-
party computation are of help for this goal.
Elevation of privilege and authorization Eleva-
tion of privileges occurs when an adversary aims to
gain access to the assets of other users or the re-
sources of the system. For instance, an adversary
may attempt to become an administrator of a message
group or a superuser of the system aiming at retriev-
ing users’ messages or executing operations as a super
user. Therefore, authorization mechanisms such as
access control lists that comply with the principle of
least privilege for user accounts and processes should
be applied.
5.3 Privacy threats and requirements
We describe the privacy threats and the corresponding
requirements in seven main classes, namely: linka-
bility and unlinkability, identifiability and anonymity,
non-repudiation and deniability, detectability and un-
detectability, information disclosure and confidential-
ity, privacy interdependence and privacy indepen-
dence, policy noncompliance and policy compliance
(see Table 2).
Identifiability and anonymity Identifiability is de-
fined as the extent to which a specific user can be
identified from a set of users, the identifiability set.
Identification is the process of linking information
to allow the inference of the identity of a specific
user (Cooper et al., 2013). An adversary can identify
a specific user by examining an Item of Interest (IOI)
such as the identity of a sender / receiver (i.e., e-mail
or phone number) or an action performed. For in-
stance, a passive ME internal adversary such as the
IM and E-mailing servers, may identify the sender
of a message by examining the headers (i.e., meta-
data) or the body of a message exchanged. Moreover,
an active TP external adversary might try to examine
the metadata of a message in transit or to correlate
traffic traffic (Zhu et al., 2010) executing timing at-
tacks (Levine et al., 2004), even in the E2E encryption
messaging systems (Levine et al., 2004).
To mitigate identifiability threats, the anonymity
of users must be guaranteed. Anonymity is defined
from the attackers perspective as the “attacker can-
not sufficiently identify the subject within a set of
subjects, the anonymity set” (Pfitzmann and Hansen,
2010). In order to make anonymity possible, there
always need to be a set of possible users such that
for an adversary the communicating user is equally
likely to be of any other user in the set (Dı´az et al.,
2002; Symeonidis and Hoeneisen, 2019). Thus, an
adversary cannot identify who is the sender of a
message. Anonymity can be achieved with the use
of pseudonyms and cryptographic schemes such as
anonymous re-mailers (i.e., mixnets) (Shirazi et al.,
2018), and secret sharing.
Linkability and unlinkability Linkability occurs
when an adversary can sufficiently distinguish within
a given system that two or more IOIs, such as sub-
jects (i.e., users), objects (i.e., messages), or actions
are related to each other (Pfitzmann and Hansen,
2010). For instance, an adversary may be able to re-
late pseudonyms by analysing exchanged messages
and deduce that the pseudonyms belong to one user
(though the user may not necessarily be identified in
this process). Therefore, unlinkability of IOIs should
be guaranteed through the use of pseudonyms as well
as cryptographic schemes such as anonymous creden-
tials (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, 2004).
Non-repudiation and deniability Non-repudiation
can be a threat to a user’s privacy for private mes-
saging systems, in contrast to security. As we prior
discussed, non-repudiation should be guaranteed for
users. However, non-repudiation carries a potential
threat in itself when it is used against a user in cer-
tain instances. For example, whistle-blowers may find
non-repudiation used against them by adversaries,
particularly in countries with strict censorship poli-
cies and in cases where human lives are at stake. Ad-
versaries in these situations may seek to use shreds
of evidence collected within a communication sys-
tem to prove to others that a whistle-blowing user was
the originator of a specific message (Symeonidis and
Hoeneisen, 2019). Therefore, plausible deniability is
essential for these users, to ensure that an adversary
can neither confirm nor contradict that a specific user
sent a particular message. For example, Bob or Eve
is unable to claim authorship of a message that was
from Alice. Deniability can be guaranteed through
the use of cryptographic protocols such as OTR for
private messaging (Borisov et al., 2004).
Detectability / observatility and undetectability
Detectability occurs when an adversary is able to suf-
ficiently distinguish an IOI, such as messages ex-
changed within the system, from random noise (Pfitz-
mann and Hansen, 2010). Observability occurs
when that detectability occurs along with a loss of
anonymity for the entities within that same system.
An adversary can exploit the states of detectability
and anonymity in order to detect, infer and possi-
bly identify users within a system. The threat posed
by an adversary can be a passive ME internal adver-
sary eavesdropping communication of messages ex-
changed. It can also be an active TP external by
seizing control of several entities and communication
links. That grants the adversary the ability to corre-
late and control traffic (Zhu et al., 2010) in order to
execute timing attacks, even in the end-to-end com-
munication systems (Levine et al., 2004).
Therefore, undetectability of IOIs should be guar-
anteed, which together with preserving the anonymity
of users it also ensures unobservability. Undetectabil-
ity for an IOI is defined as that “the attacker can-
not sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not”
while unobservability also incorporates “anonymity
of the subject(s) involved in the IOI” (Pfitzmann
and Hansen, 2010). Undetectability can be achieved
through the use of cryptographic schemes such as
mix-nets (Shirazi et al., 2018; Symeonidis and
Hoeneisen, 2019) and obfuscation mechanisms such
as the insertion of dummy traffic within a system.
Information disclosure and confidentiality Infor-
mation disclosure - or loss of confidentiality - about
users, message content, metadata, or other informa-
tion is not only a security but also a privacy threat
that a communicating system can face. For example,
a successful MiTM attack can yield message content
and metadata that can be used to determine not only
the content of a message by also with whom a spe-
cific user communicates with, and how frequently. To
guarantee the confidentiality of messages and prevent
information disclosure, security measures need to be
guaranteed with the use of cryptographic primitives
and protocols such as symmetric, asymmetric or ho-
momorphic encryption and secret sharing.
Privacy interdependence and privacy indepen-
dence Privacy interdependence is defined as the
scenario when the privacy of users is affected by de-
cisions taken and actions initiated by anyone but the
user thyself (Symeonidis, 2018). Privacy interdepen-
dence is related to relational and spatial privacy as
there were defined by Clark (Roger Clarke, 2016) and
Biczo´k (Biczo´k and Chia, 2013). Relational privacy
considers how a user relates to and communicate with
other users (Biczo´k and Chia, 2013). For instance, a
passive TE (i.e., identity, and key management server)
and ME servers can learn the contacts that a user is
related to such as names, phone numbers, E-mailing
addresses and public keys from the contacts list of a
user. With spatial privacy a user is affected by the ac-
tions of another user on the invasion on the virtual on-
line space of a user (Biczo´k and Chia, 2013). For in-
stance, a user might forward a message to other users
without the notification and consent of the involved
users affecting their privacy. Therefore, independent
privacy is essential and must be guaranteed for each
user in private messaging systems. It needs to ensure
the transparency and direct consent to the informa-
tion sharing by the users that are involved in com-
municating. Moreover, to safeguard individual pri-
vacy protocols considering cryptographic primitives
such as zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty com-
putation needs to be designed and implemented.
Policy non-compliance and policy compliance
Policy non-compliance can be a threat to the privacy
of users in a private messaging system. An adversary,
can attempt to collect and process information about
users in E-mailing and IM without the users’ aware-
ness, notification and explicit consent such as for ad-
vertisement purposes. That can result in unauthorized
processing of users information under the GDPR (Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Council, 2016)
resulting in profiling, and censorship. Therefore, data
protection policy compliance must be guaranteed. It
can be achieved with auditing tools such as with Data
Protection Impact Assessment (European Commis-
sion, ) considering the (European Parliament and the
European Council, 2016).
6 Limitations and discussion
We compiled a preliminary, yet rich, list threats
and requirements for private messaging systems.
However, to fulfill the requirements, one needs to re-
fer to specific cryptographic protocols. This task is
left as future work.
At the level where our work stands (i.e., threats
and requirements) certain system differences between
E-mailing and IM are neglected. We expect these dif-
ferences emerging and impacting design choices. For
example, OTRv4 protocol (Bini and Celi, 2018) con-
siders these difference to provide E2E while preserv-
ing the same security and privacy requirements for
both systems.
7 Conclusion
This paper’s goal has been that of systematically
discuss threats against private messaging in the two
domains of E-mailing and IM when servers are un-
trusted. The two application types have strong simi-
larities, which allowed us to apply for both the same
threat modelling methodologies; but they are not
identical and already from our analysis relevant dif-
ference emerged due to the different nature, on-line
and off-line, of the two communication paradigms.
Fulfil the same requirements, such as perfect forward
secrecy, calls for different solutions.
We provided a detailed and comparative analysis
of the systems, describing the entities involved, the
operations, and the system features. We have identi-
fied, discussed, and catalogued the classes of threats
that can exploit the assets of users and the system. We
have, for each threat, discussed the opposing security
and privacy requirements.
Our investigation remains within the scope of spe-
cific features of privacy messaging: messages ex-
change, search and archiving, and contact synchro-
nization. We intend for the future to extend the anal-
ysis to other features, such as, key management and
key synchronization among different devices.
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Table 2: Entities that can be utilized as adversaries for private messaging systems.
User Assets System Assets
Adversarial model:
Passive  / Active — Internal ¨ (TE, ME, User)
Passive  / Active — External ˚ (TP)
ID
(e-mail, phone #)
(Pk, certificates)
Contacts
list
Message content
(Text, attachments)
Metadata
(Sender, receiver, packet size)
TE Servers
ME Servers
Classes of Threats Classes of Requirements
Spoofing S — ¨ (TE)— ˚ (TP) - - - - EA Entity Authentication
Tampering with Data T - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - - DA Data Authentication
Origin / Delivery - - — ¨ (User) - - Origin / Delivery
Repudiation Submission / Receipt R - - — ¨ (User) - - NR Submission / Receipt Non-repudiation
Current - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - - CurrentInformation
Disclosure Previous / FutureMessages
I - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - - C Forward / BackwardSecrecy Confidentiality
Denial of Service D - - - - — ˚ (TP) Av Availability
S
Elevation of Privilege E - - - - — ¨ (User)— ˚ (TP) A Authorization
Linkability L - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - An Unlinkability
Identifiability I - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - Un Anonymity
Origin / Delivery - - — ¨ (ME, User(receiver))— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - Origin / Delivery
Non-repudiation Submission / Receipt N - - — ¨ (ME, User(receiver))— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - Den Submission / Receipt Deniability
Detectability D - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - UnDect Undetectability
Current - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - CurrentInformation
Disclosure Previous / Future D - - — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) — ¨ (ME)— ˚ (TP) - C Forward / Backward Confidentiality
Privacy Interdependence I - — ¨ (TE, ME, User) — ¨ (ME, User(receiver)) - - PI Privacy Independence
P
Policy non-compliance N — ¨ (TE, ME) — ¨ (TE, ME) — ¨ (TE, ME) — ¨ (TE, ME) - PN Policy compliance
